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EITC CORRESPONDENCE AUDITS:
AN EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) is a tax credit available to
working individuals who make under a certain income level. Although
the credit is offered to some childless workers, the main purpose of
the credit is to aid working families with one or more dependent children.1 Research suggests that the credit can have a considerable, positive impact on those who qualify for, and receive, the credit.2
While EITC claimants have some of the lowest incomes in the
United States, their returns are audited at disproportionately high
rates.3 The focus on this group of taxpayers stems from several
sources. First, data suggests that improper claims of the EITC is high,
however, the actual number of improper claims is disputed.4 Second,
there is a focus on limiting improper payouts on EITC claims in Congress, despite the fact that improper payouts of the EITC make up
only a tiny portion of the overall tax deficit.5 Third, low- and mediumincome returns, including EITC returns, are simpler and cheaper to
audit than returns from higher income filers and businesses.6
This Comment will discuss why audited EITC claimants have a
valid equal protection claim against the government for the Internal
Revenue Services (“IRS”)’s auditing practices. While the Court has
never held that wealth is a suspect classification for the purposes of
equal protection,7 EITC claimants substantially satisfy the factors
used by the Court to establish suspect classification. Despite this, it
would be unlikely that the Supreme Court would find the indigent are
a suspect class. A finding of suspect classification would require the
Court to draw a hard line to delineate a class based on economic con1. Earned Income Tax Credits, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/policy/hst/hi5/taxcredits/index.html (last reviewed June 30, 2021) [hereinafter
CDC, Earned Income Tax Credits].
2. Id.
3. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, IRS DATA BOOK, 2018 23–26 tbl.9a (2018). For consistency,
the data and calculations in this Comment are based on the IRS’s tax audit data from 2018.
4. See infra Part II.A.3.
5. See infra Part II.A.5.
6. See infra Part II.A.6.
7. Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An Open
Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407, 408 (2010).
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dition, which it has been hesitant to do.8 While the government may
have a compelling interest in limiting the tax deficit, evidence suggests
that the high rate of correspondence audits of EITC claimants—
driven by desire for administrative efficiency—is not reasonably related to the government’s goal of achieving a smaller tax deficit.
A case of this kind would be difficult for a plaintiff to win, as equal
protection lawsuits that challenge patterns of enforcement by government entities require plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent.9 Despite
this, a lawsuit of this kind could encourage courts to reevaluate the
indigent as a suspect class in a novel context. A challenge to the IRS’s
auditing practice would also draw attention to the negative impact of
congressional budget cuts on the federal refund auditing system and
Congress’s disproportionate focus on EITC refunds. An equal protection challenge could also highlight the detrimental effect of certain
IRS auditing practices on low-income claimants and encourage the
IRS to follow the advice of taxpayer advocates and implement reforms to remedy the inequities in the U.S. tax system.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Earned Income Tax Credit
The EITC is one of the most significant anti-poverty features of the
U.S. tax code today, but it began as a temporary measure to aid lowincome, working families and encourage economic growth during a
period of recession.10 The credit was seen as an incentive for low-income people to work and, if successful, would cut back on unemployment and welfare costs.11
Despite the original intent of Congress, the EITC has remained part
of the U.S. tax code, though the credit has grown and evolved since its
inception. In the decades after its enactment, the maximum amount of
credit was raised several times to reflect increases in the cost of living,
8. See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
9. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
10. Thomas L. Hungerford & Rebecca Thiess, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child
Tax Credit (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-income-tax-credit-andthe-child-tax-credit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/.
11. Id.; MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44825, THE EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3–4 (2018) (quoting the Finance
Committee Report on the Tax Reduction Act of 1975). As more recent data and research shows,
the perception that individuals living at or below the poverty line who are able to work do not is
a misconception. Elise Gould, Poor People Work: A Majority of Poor People Who Can Work
Do, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 19, 2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/poor-people-work-a-majority-of-poor-people-who-can-work-do/.
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inflation, and Social Security taxes.12 Around twenty years after its
enactment, the EITC went through a significant overhaul. Among the
changes were those to combat noncompliance.13 These changes had
“the intention of reducing fraudulent claims, better targeting benefits,
and improving administration.”14 The scrutiny of EITC claims continued into the 2000s with further changes to reduce improper payments.15 Today, scrutiny of EITC refunds remains high.16
1. How Do People Qualify for the EITC?
The EITC targets low-income, working families. The amount of
credit a filer is entitled to is measured by an individual’s earned income multiplied by a credit percentage.17 Eight different formulas are
used to calculate credit returns. The formula used depends on whether
a filer is married or unmarried and the amount of dependent children
they have.18 The EITC varies by income; the credit limit raises as an
individual’s income increases to a certain point until the credit is no
longer available.19 A claim for the credit is based on three factors—
earned income, relationship of qualifying children, and minimum residency of qualifying children.20
2. Importance of the Credit for Claimants
Despite being a tax credit, the EITC can be viewed as part tax
credit, part welfare.21 One of the purposes of enactment, to mitigate
cash welfare payments, is evidence of the credit’s hybrid nature.22
Though it is a tax credit, the EITC has become one of the largest
12. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 11, at 4.
13. Id. at 4–7 (In addition, the credit was increased, opened to childless workers, and modified
to vary by family size.).
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 10.
16. See Improper Payments in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 114th
Cong. 7 (2015); see generally Improper Payments in the Administration of Refundable Tax Credits: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong.
(2011).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1); Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught
in the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351, 361–62 (2002).
18. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 11, at 12.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 32(b)(1)(A); Book, supra note 17, at 362.
20. Karie Davis-Nozemack, Unequal Burdens in EITC Compliance, 31 LAW & INEQ. 37, 47–48
(2012).
21. Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1869 (2005).
22. Id.; see also CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 11, at 3 (One of the initial purposes of the
enactment of the EITC was to mitigate that amount low-income individuals claimed in cash
welfare.).
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welfare programs in the country, second only to Social Security.23 For
those with children who received the credit, research shows that there
is a significant, positive impact.24 The Congressional Research Service
(“CRS”) found that unmarried households with children living in poverty who claimed the credit saw significant benefits.25 For example,
the percent of unmarried households with three children living with
income between 50% and 100% of the poverty line dropped from
28.3% to 22.2% with the credit.26
Research also indicates the receipt of the EITC may have health
and education benefits for families living at or below the poverty
line.27 While it is difficult to measure the precise impact of the EITC
on the health and education of low-income recipients of the credit, the
EITC is an effective anti-poverty measure and likely has a positive
effect on the health and well-being of its recipients.28 Studies that
measure the impact of the EITC reflect this; receipt of the credit was
associated with reduced occurrences of low birth weight and better
maternal health.29 This effect stems from the well-established notion
that poverty is linked to poor health, especially in infants and children.30 Research has similarly shown that receipt of the EITC has a
positive effect on the education of children in households that receive
the credit. Receiving the EITC may positively impact student test
scores and college attendance.31
23. Bekah Mandell, Race and State-level Earned Income Tax Credits: Another Case of Welfare
Racism?, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 2 (2008).
24. CDC, Earned Income Tax Credits, supra note 1.
25. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK & JOSEPH S. HUGHES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R44057, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 14–17 (2018).
26. Id. at 16.
27. Id. at 20; CDC, Earned Income Tax Credits, supra note 1.
28. CDC, Earned Income Tax Credits, supra note 1.
29. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 11, at 18–19 (“Several recent studies suggest that the
EITC is associated with increases in birth weight and a reduction in the incidence of LBW. One
study found that a $1,000 increase in the EITC was associated with a reduction in the incidence
of LBW by approximately 3%, and an increase in mean birth weight. Another study found that
the EITC was associated with improvements in maternal health; EITC-eligible mothers were less
likely to have risky levels of certain biomarkers (i.e., high blood pressure or other indicators
associated with cardiovascular disease and inflammation).”).
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 20–21. “Researchers looking at the test scores of children in elementary school in a
large urban school district found that children in families that received larger EITCs (and the
refundable portion of the child tax credit) tended to score higher on English and math tests.
(Similar results were found by researchers looking at the impact of legislative expansions to the
EITC in the 1990s. They found that the children in families that received the largest increase in
the credit tended to score higher on math and reading tests).” Id. at 20. However, it is still
unclear in what way the increased credit is impacting the scores. Similarly, researchers cannot
separate the possible effects of the EITC from the possible effects of employment on both health
and education.
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3. Improper Payments of EITC
Improper payments and overclaims have been a concern in the administration of the EITC for decades.32 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), an improper payment is
“any payment that should not have been made or that was made in an
incorrect amount under statutory, contractual, administrative, or
other legally applicable requirements. Among other things, it includes
payment to an ineligible recipient, payment for an ineligible good or
service, and any duplicate payment.”33 2018 reports from the IRS
placed the rate of improper payments at 25% with the balance of improper payments at $18.4 billion.34
It is difficult to pinpoint what percentage of improper EITC returns
are claimed through fraud and what percentage of improper payments
are attributable to mistake, though the IRS has acknowledged that
most improper payments are caused by errors due to the complexity
of the credit, rather than fraud.35 In 2014, the IRS released a study
that identified the three main ways that claimants improperly file their
EITC refunds. The three main reasons were: claiming children who
were not qualifying children, misreporting income, and using an incorrect filing status.36
There are a number of factors that likely impact the level of improper claims. First, initial eligibility for the credit is determined by
the taxpayer, unlike other similarly situated programs, which require
some type of application before claiming the benefit.37 The complexity
that surrounds child residency and whether a particular individual is a
“qualified child,” coupled with the self-reporting nature, also contributes to the erroneous claims.38 The complex nature of claiming the
benefit contributes to the erroneous filing.39 Finally, low-income filers
32. See generally CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 11 (providing chronological discussion of
the compliance concerns through the decades); Stephen D. Holt, Keeping it in Context: Earned
Income Tax Credit Compliance and Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183,
185 (2006).
33. Improper Payments in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 114th
Cong. 11–12 (2015) (statement from Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United
States).
34. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 91, 93 (2018).
35. Id. at 79; see Holt, supra note 32, at 186.
36. MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RES. SERV., R43873, THE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT (EITC): ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES 4 (2015).
37. Improper Payments in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 114th
Cong. 8 (2015) (statement from Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United
States).
38. Id.
39. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 38.
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are less likely to be financially literate and have access to tax professionals and support services, which likely contributes to the improper
payment rate.40
4. Challenges to IRS Data on Improper Payments
Data from other sources indicates that the percent of improper payments and overall balance of improper payments is actually much
lower than the IRS estimates.41 The National Taxpayer Advocate
(“NTA”) challenged the efficacy of the data produced by the IRS
based on the fact that the IRS data is compiled before any recovery of
improper payments.42 Additionally, the IRS’s error rate does not consider underpayments or cases when the incorrect parent claimed the
EITC which resulted in an underpayment, or lack of payment, to the
correct parent.43 The NTA estimates that for every dollar of improper
payments of the EITC, forty cents goes unclaimed.44 In 2014, the
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration estimated that improper payments of the credit equaled $17.7 billion, but that $7.3 billion of the credit went unclaimed.45 Additionally, EITC improper
payments and overclaims represent a relatively small place in the tax
gap. In 2015, for example, even when only considering individual tax
noncompliance, EITC overclaims accounted for only 6% of the tax
gap.46
5. Targeting of EITC Returns for Audit
Despite the conflict over the actual level of overpayment of the
EITC and the relatively small impact EITC overpayments have in the
tax gap, the IRS’s high estimates of EITC improper payments has encouraged the IRS and Congressional focus on EITC compliance.47
Congress began targeting improper EITC claims in earnest in the mid1990s.48 Congress was concerned with, among other things, the
amount of credit being claimed in error, and the subsequent improper
payments. The changes made to the credit through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 sought to limit the availability of the credit for certain
40. Id. at 64.
41. Id. at 69–70.
42. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 34, at 91.
43. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 70; see Holt, supra note 32, at 185 n.17.
44. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 34, at 95.
45. Id. at 95 n.28.
46. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 36, at 3–4.
47. See Davis-Nozemack supra note 20, at 40.
48. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 11 at 7 (citing Speaker Gingrich, “Taming the EITC,”
Congressional Record, October 17, 1995, p. E1952).
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individuals and reduce fraud. Among other changes, the Act established strict penalties for those who improperly claim the credit in a
reckless or fraudulent manner.49 Furthermore, in the 1990s, there was
an increase in the IRS’s budget and $100 million was specifically
earmarked for EITC examinations.50 Later, the Protecting Americans
from Tax Hikes Act also sought to limit improper payments of the
credit. One of the provisions of the Act required the IRS to withhold
EITC refunds until a later date and required more compensation information from employers to evaluate EITC returns for income reporting errors.51 Congress has continued to focus on EITC improper
payments.52
Improper payment laws also impact the level of scrutiny of EITC
returns.53 The purposes of improper payment laws are to limit the
government from improperly paying parties and produce a “systematic framework for improper payment identification, measurement,
planning, and reporting.”54 These laws, stemming from federal statutes and an executive order, require agencies to report any improper
payments amounting to $10 million or over.55 Federal programs with
the highest improper payments must report on their current and future actions for lowering the improper payments.56 Because the EITC
improper payment balance is over the $10 million threshold, it is subject to the increased scrutiny required by the improper payment laws.
The focus on improper payments of the EITC has led to high audit
rates of EITC returns, relative to other groups. There were
195,750,099 returns filed in 2018; 76.6% were individual returns (including EITC returns), 0.9% were corporate returns, and 13.8% were
EITC returns.57 The audit rate of all tax returns in 2018 was 0.5% and
the total recommended additional payment in thousands of dollars
was $26,514,334.00.58 Individual income tax returns were audited at an
average rate of 0.6% and netted $9,050,651.00 in recommended additional payments, comprising 34% of the total recommended addi49. Id. at 7–8 (The penalties included a ten-year ban on claiming the credit for those who had
claimed it fraudulently.).
50. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 58.
51. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 11, at 11.
52. See Improper Payments in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 114th
Cong. 3 (2015); Improper Payments in the Administration of Refundable Tax Credits: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 3 (2011).
53. See Davis-Nozemack supra note 20, at 59.
54. Id. at 42.
55. Id. at 43.
56. Id.
57. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 23 tbl.9a.
58. Id. at 23–24.
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tional payments.59 Corporate returns were audited at 0.9% and netted
additional payments of $14,380,571.00, comprising 54% of additional
payments.60 Individual return of EITC claimants with returns under
$25,000.00 were audited at 1.4% with a recommended additional payment total of $1,679,971.00 and EITC returns over $25,000 were audited at 1% with a recommended additional payment of $268,416.00.
Together, these recommended additional payments for EITC returns
comprised 7.3% of the total recommended additional payments.61
6. Budget Cuts to the IRS and Use of Correspondence
Examinations
Congressional budget cuts to the IRS over the past years have been
significant.62 The operating cost of the IRS has dropped from over $14
billion in 2010 to $11.7 billion in 2018.63 When measured for inflation,
that comes to approximately a 20% decrease.64 Full-time positions
with the IRS have dropped from 94,711 in 2010 to 73,519 in 2018.65
The Congressional Budget Justification and Annual Performance Report and Plan for the 2020 fiscal year will increase the IRS’s base
budget and funds for enforcement, though most of that will be applied
to aging IRS technical infrastructure.66 Budget cuts have had a significant impact on the number of examinations conducted by the IRS. In
2010, examinations covered 0.9% of the total returns, while in 2018
that number was down to 0.5%, about a 44% decrease.67 While examinations have dropped for both individual and business returns,68 some
59. Id.
60. Id. at 23–25.
61. Id. at 23–24.
62. See Letter from Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner of the IRS, to Senator Ron Wyden,
Ranking Member Committee on Finance (Sept. 6, 2019), available at https://assets.document
cloud.org/documents/6430680/Document-2019-9-6-Treasury-Letter-to-Wyden-RE.pdf [hereinafter “Rettig Letter”].
63. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 63 (Data for 2010 adjusted for inflation
using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Nondefense Gross Domestic Product Chain-type
Price Index with a 2018 base year.).
64. Increase Appropriations for the Internal Revenue Service’s Enforcement Initiatives, CONG.
BUDGET OFF. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2018/54826.
65. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 74.
66. Janet Holtzblatt, The Administration’s IRS Budget Contains The Good, The Bad, And The
Uncertain, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/administra
tions-irs-budget-contains-good-bad-and-uncertain.
67. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 64; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra
note 3, at 23–26 tbl.9a; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA
BOOK, 2010, 22 tbl.9a. (2011), available at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-irs-databook-index-of-tables.
68. Rettig Letter, supra note 62, at 2.
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examination rates have dropped more than others based on the type
of examination used.69
The budget cuts have affected field and correspondence audits in
different ways.70 Correspondence audits are conducted by mail, while
field audits are conducted face-to-face.71 Between 2000 and 2010, the
use of correspondence audits by the IRS for examining returns almost
tripled.72 According to the IRS, the increase in correspondence audits
was directly related to the budget cuts within the IRS.73 While the
audit rate has plateaued at approximately 75% correspondence audits
and the remaining 25% field audits, some groups, namely EITC returns, are much more likely to be audited by a correspondence audit
than a field audit.74 In 2018, the vast majority of EITC audits were
correspondence audits.75 For claimants with income below $25,000,
96.6% of the examinations conducted on the returns for that group
were correspondence audits. 76
When an EITC return is submitted, each return is compared against
third-party data and past tax filing information. Certain returns are
flagged for potential issues and assigned risk scores based on the potential noncompliance issue. Returns rated for the highest possibility
of noncompliance are available for audit.77 If a return is chosen for
audit, a correspondence letter is automatically sent to the taxpayer
requesting additional documentation. The taxpayer then typically has
thirty days to respond and the refund is put on hold until the matter is
resolved.78 If the taxpayer does not respond to the notice, the credit is
disallowed in full.79 If the taxpayer responds with documentation, the
69. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 23 tbl.9a, 22, tbl.9a (The examination rate
for EITC recipients for income under $25,000 is at 1.4% and above $25,000 is at 1.0% in 2018. In
2010 the examination rates for those groups were at 2.4% and 1.8% respectively. The examination rate for returns for income at least $200,000 and under $1,000,000 was 0.6% for nonbusiness
returns and 1.4% for business returns in 2018. In 2010 the examination rates for those groups
were at 2.5% and 2.9% respectively. Examination rates for returns with total income over
$1,000,000 or more was 3.2% in 2018. In 2010 the examination rate for that group was at 8.4%.)
70. Id. at 23–26.
71. See Holt, supra note 32, at 191.
72. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 38.
73. Rettig Letter, supra note 62, at 2.
74. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 23–26 tbl.9a.
75. Id.
76. Id.; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 67, at 22, tbl.9a (The total amount of EITC
returns examined from claimants making less than $25,000 was 363,098 and the amount of those
which were correspondence audits was 350,838. There was not, however, a high rate of correspondence audits for EITC returns from claimants making $25,000 or more.).
77. John Guyton et al., The Effects of EITC Correspondence Audits on Low-Income Earners,
7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24465, 2019).
78. Id. at 8.
79. Id.
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IRS will then either come to a decision or request additional information.80 If the IRS determines the credit was claimed in full or in part in
error, the taxpayer can either passively or actively (through a response
letter) accept the decision or actively challenge the decision to disallow the credit.81
Correspondence audits are much cheaper for the IRS to administer.82 According to the IRS, correspondence audits take approximately 5 hours per return while field audits take from 61 to 251 hours
per return.83 Examiners conducting field audits, usually reserved for
higher yielding and more complex individual and business returns, require special expertise not required for examiners conducting correspondence audits.84 Of the total additional tax dollars recommended
after examinations in 2018, approximately 80% of those dollars were
recommended from field audits despite the fact that only a quarter of
all audits are field audits.85
7. Limitations and Effects of EITC Correspondence Examinations
There are benefits and shortcomings to both field and correspondence audits. Field audits are expensive and require more experienced
examiners, though they produce more recommended additional payments. While correspondence audits are cheaper to conduct, the drawbacks of these audits are significant, especially in the context of EITC
examinations.86 The cited limitations of correspondence examinations
include the lack of support services for audit exams and the self-administration of the credit. While this keeps EITC administrative costs
very low, it shifts the costs of administration to the claimants due to
the complicated nature of claiming the credit, which increases the
claimant’s need for professional assistance.87 However, around 98%
of taxpayers who experience EITC examination are unrepresented.88
The examination process itself is complicated and the letters difficult
to read for a variety of reasons, including readability and the financial
literacy of the claimants.89
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Rettig Letter, supra note 62, at 1; see Davis-Nozemack supra note 20, at 54.
83. Rettig Letter, supra note 62, at 3.
84. Id. at 1–2.
85. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 23–26 tbl.9a.
86. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 38.
87. Id. at 55–56.
88. Id. at 38.
89. Id. at 64 (There are readability issues associated with certain formats of the correspondence letters, the letters are not written in plain language and use tax-specific terms unfamiliar
to the average taxpayer. These issues are compounded by the fact that low-income individuals

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-4\DPL403.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 11

17-DEC-21

EITC CORRESPONDENCE AUDITS

13:11

787

Confusing IRS correspondence, illiteracy, language barriers, and
unequal access to competent tax professionals can cause taxpayers—particularly low-income taxpayers—to miss the deadline for
filing a petition. Indeed, a 2007 TAS study found more than onequarter of taxpayers receiving an EITC audit notice did not understand that the IRS was auditing their return, almost 40 percent did
not understand what the IRS was questioning, and only about half
of the respondents felt that they knew what they needed to do. In
other words, there are circumstances in which deficiency procedures
do not give taxpayers a realistic opportunity to petition the Tax
Court.90

To compound this issue, the IRS’s phone service is inaccessible and
leaves claimants without resources to understand the examination
process once a return has been selected for a correspondence audit.91
It is also very challenging for a claimant to transfer the audit to a faceto-face setting.92 Thus, most claimants who receive a correspondence
audit do not apply for reconsideration93 and a significant amount of
disallowed EITC benefits are due to failure to receive correspondence
or failure to respond.94
Recent research suggests that correspondence audits may have a
significant effect on EITC claimants that extends past the initial difficulty in navigating the audit process.95 In years after being audited,
are more likely to have issues with functional and financial literacy.); see also NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 104 (2007) (Over 70% found that the letter
was not easy to understand, 26.5% did not know that the IRS was auditing their return, and
38.9% did not know what the IRS was questioning.).
90. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 34, at 378.
91. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 63, 67.
92. Id. at 63 (“[A] taxpayer may petition to change the venue, which could mean changing
from a correspondence examination (i.e., a campus examination) to a face-to-face office examination. This regulation gives the Service the discretion to grant the request after considering six
factors. Despite the list of factors, many IRS service centers take the view that correspondence
examinations will be transferred only in the instances of hardship.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
93. See Holt, supra note 32, at 192 (“The original audit results may reflect the ability to negotiate the initial review process more than indicating eligibility for the EITC.”).
94. Id. at 191 n.52 (citing NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, THE NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE’S FISCAL YEAR 2004 OBJECTIVES REPORT TO CONGRESS 23 (2003)) (“Data from the
EITC Program Office in 2003 indicated that more than 30% of taxpayers undergoing EITC
correspondence audits over the previous three years had either not received the IRS notices or
had failed to respond to them.”); id. (citing NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, I.R.S., PUB’N NO.
2104b (Rev. 12-2004), 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 2 EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
(EITC) AUDIT RECONSIDERATION STUDY 21 (2004)) (In a sample of cases in which the taxpayer
sought reconsideration of an adverse EITC audit determination, the primary cause of the determination in 42% of them was either no taxpayer response or a late response.); Guyton et al.,
supra note 77, at 3 (Within the research group in this study, 76% to 80% of claims were disallowed due to undelivered mail, nonresponse, or insufficient response and confirmed ineligibility
due to error was around 15%.).
95. Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 20.
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individuals are less likely to claim potential EITC benefits despite
meeting the benefit criteria.96 After undergoing a correspondence audit, EITC claimants are less likely to file a tax return in general.97
Furthermore, audited wage earners may be less likely to have wage
employment in the years right after a correspondence audit.98
B. Equal Protection
1. Generally
Equal protection refers to the doctrine that individuals must be
given equal protection and treatment under the government’s laws.99
Equal protection in the U.S. stems from two amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees individuals equal protection from discriminatory state action, while the guarantee of equal protection from
discriminatory federal action is read into the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.100 Equal protection rights are anti-caste and
anti-class,101 and exist to ensure that individuals who are similarly situated are equally protected under the law.102 The purpose of equal protection is to protect individuals against “legislation whose purpose or
effect is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes[ ]” based
on invidious, arbitrary, or capricious discrimination.103
2. Types of Discriminatory Laws and Practices
A law or policy may violate an individual’s equal protection if it is
facially discriminatory.104 A facially neutral law may also violate an
individual’s equal protection if the law has an underlying discriminatory purpose, if it is applied in a discriminatory way, or has a discriminatory impact.105 A facially discriminatory law draws distinctions
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1.
98. Id. at 5 (“[F]or audited wage earners who have wage employment (i.e., have a W-2) in the
year of selection, there are decreases in the likelihood of having wage employment in the years
just after the EITC correspondence audits, and the decreases are larger for taxpayers with
younger (ages 0-5) qualifying children.”).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
100. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6
(1981).
101. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994);
Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 913 (2013).
102. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
103. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
104. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
105. See generally Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960).
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between groups on its face.106 Not all facially discriminatory laws violate equal protection; it depends on the groups affected by the law and
whether fundamental rights are at issue in the legislation.107 If a
facially discriminatory law draws distinctions based on suspect classification, it will likely be invalidated.108
A facially neutral law can also be found to violate equal protection
based on its discriminatory application or impact.109 However, just because a law affects some differently than others does not mean it is
discriminatory; a plaintiff challenging a law based on discriminatory
impact must show that it was the intent of the government entity to
discriminate.110 In Washington v. Davis, plaintiffs challenged the administration of a police entrance exam and alleged that the test disproportionately excluded African Americans from police service.111
In finding for the state, the Court held that a discriminatory impact is
not enough to invalidate a facially neutral practice—a plaintiff must
show discriminatory intent on the part of the government.112 The
Court found that discriminatory impact can be evidence of discriminatory intent, but cannot alone be evidence of a discriminatory purpose.113 However, a plaintiff does not need to show that the
discriminatory purpose was the sole motivation behind the law or
practice.114 The Court considers both direct and circumstantial evidence when determining discriminatory intent, including events leading up to the challenged practice, legislative or administrative history,
or significant changes in procedure.115 If a plaintiff is able to show an
improper purpose, the burden shifts to the government to show that
the same practice would be in place regardless of the discriminatory
purpose.116
3. Standards of Review
Courts apply different standards of review in equal protection
claims depending on what groups are affected by a law’s classification
106. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678 (19th ed. 2016).
107. Id. at 678–82.
108. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
109. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356.
110. Davis, 426 U.S. at 231.
111. Id. at 233.
112. Id. at 239.
113. Id. at 241.
114. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 269 (1977).
115. Id. at 267–68.
116. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 106, at 690.
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or whether the classification limits a fundamental right.117 The general
rule, known as the rational basis test, is that a law is presumed valid
“if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”118 The rational basis test is the lowest level of
scrutiny applied by courts to equal protection questions. Rational basis is applied when there are no issues of fundamental rights or suspect
classifications at issue.119
Early articulation of a heightened standard of scrutiny came in
United States v. Carolene Products Co.120 In a footnote, the Court left
open the possibility that a heightened form of scrutiny would be appropriate in certain circumstances.121 Over time, the Supreme Court
has established different standards of review depending on whether
the classification drawn by the law affects members of a particular
group or whether the law restricts a fundamental right.122 Laws and
policies that discriminate against suspect classes receive the highest
level of scrutiny known as strict scrutiny.123 Suspect classes are limited
and include classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin.124 Under strict scrutiny, the government must show that the law
or policy is in place to further a compelling government interest and
the policy must also be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.125
Strict scrutiny is also applied when fundamental Constitutional rights
are in question.126
Intermediate scrutiny sits between rational basis and strict scrutiny
and is applied to laws and policies that discriminate against quasi-suspect classes.127 Quasi-suspect classifications include gender128 and legitimacy of birth.129 Under intermediate scrutiny a law or policy must
be substantially related to an important government interest.130 Some
117. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
121. Id. (stating that heightened scrutiny may be appropriate where laws discriminated based
on religious, racial, or nationality).
122. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
123. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984).
124. Id.; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440
(Classifications at the state level based on alienage and national origin are subject to strict scrutiny; classifications at the federal level are reviewed through the rational basis test because of the
federal government’s power to regulate immigration.).
125. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432–33.
126. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
127. Id. at 440–41.
128. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
129. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
130. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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view the equal protection standards of review as a spectrum, rather
than three clear-cut tests.131
4. Suspect Classification
Heightened scrutiny and suspect classification are interconnected,
as suspect classification is only one of two ways a court will apply
heightened scrutiny to a law or practice.132 The reasoning behind the
existence of suspect classification is three-fold. First, certain classifications reflect prejudice rather than the furtherance of some legislative
objective.133 Second, legislation based on those prejudices is in conflict
with the notion at the center of our constitution—that every person
should be judged as an individual.134 Third, certain groups have suffered a history of discrimination and, thus, need greater protection
from the political process.135
The Court has held that race, alienage, and national origin, are suspect classifications and gender and legitimacy of birth are quasi-suspect classifications.136 Although the Supreme Court is not always clear
as to what factors are required for suspect classification, the Court has
applied the following factors to determine whether a group is a suspect class—whether the group has been subjected to a history of discrimination, whether the class shares an immutable trait, whether the
group is a discrete and insular minority, whether the trait affects the
individual’s ability to contribute to society, and whether the group’s
political power is diminished.137 While these factors are the most often
cited in equal protection decisions, not every opinion from the Court
regarding equal protection and suspect classification has addressed
every factor.138 Additionally, the way the Court has defined some of
these factors has changed over time.139
131. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451–52 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing that the “standards of . . . review,” rational basis, intermediate, and strict, are not well-defined but rather there
is a spectrum of analysis applied to equal protection claims).
132. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
133. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (race); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
371–72 (1971) (alienage); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644–46 (1948) (national origin);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (gender); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972) (legitimacy).
137. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 742
(2014).
138. Tiffany C. Graham, The Shifting Doctrinal Face of Immutability, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 169, 178–79 (2011).
139. See generally Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CAL. L. REV. 323 (2016).
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a. History of Discrimination
One important indicator of a suspect classification is whether the
group has endured a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” that
has relegated the group to a position of diminished political power.140
In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court applied a heightened level of
scrutiny141 to a policy discriminating against servicewomen for ease of
administration of military benefits.142 In doing so, the Court outlined
the role the government played in enacting laws and authoring decisions that limited or denied women equal rights or equal role in the
political process.143
Just because a group has been discriminated against does not mean
that the conduct necessarily rises to historic purposeful discrimination.
For example, when the Court held that mental disability was not a
suspect classification, it did so despite the fact that people with mental
disabilities have suffered significant mistreatment.144 Similarly, the
Court found that the elderly are not a suspect class, though it admitted
that the group faced a history of discrimination.145 The Court stated
that the aged “unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against
on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a ‘history
of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of
their abilities.”146
b. Obvious, Immutable, or Distinguishing Characteristics
Immutability refers to the permanent, often visible, nature of the
characteristic that distinguishes a group as a suspect class.147 In holding that race, national origin, gender, and illegitimacy of birth are suspect or quasi-suspect classifications, the Court addressed the fact that
the characteristic that defines these groups is unchanging.148 The factor of immutability is tied to the concept of culpability and individual
responsibility.149 The Court has reasoned that burdening a party for
140. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
141. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691–92 (Powell, J., concurring) (not strict scrutiny, the majority was
split on what standard to apply).
142. Id. at 690–91.
143. Id. at 684–85.
144. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454–55 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
145. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
146. Id.
147. Graham, supra note 138, at 172.
148. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
149. Graham, supra note 138, at 180.
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something over which they have no control, like race, gender, or illegitimacy, offends our system of government.150 For example, in Weber
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, the Court held that a statute
that discriminated based on legitimacy of birth violated equal protection, in part, because illegitimacy was an unchangeable condition of
birth, over which a child had no control.151 Contrastingly, in Plyler v.
Doe, the Court stated that undocumented immigrants are culpable for
their undocumented status and, thus, suspect classification is
inappropriate.152
While immutability is a traditional indication of a suspect classification,153 it appears that it is not a necessary component in a suspect
classification analysis.154 Further, an immutable characteristic does
not guarantee a suspect classification, and the Court has expressly declined to extend suspect classification to age and mental disability,
both of which could be considered immutable characteristics.155
c. Discrete and Insular Minority
The Court has also looked to whether the group seeking suspect
classification and heightened scrutiny for an equal protection claim is
a discrete and insular minority. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, the Court held that the mentally disabled are not a quasi-suspect class, in part, because those with a mental disability vary in capacity, and “range from those whose disability is not immediately
evident to those who must be constantly cared for.”156 The defining
characteristic, mental disability, was too diverse to create a discrete
group.157
The Court also addressed the discrete and insular factor in Bullock
v. Carter, where the Court struck down a state election filing fee on
the grounds of violating equal protection of those with lower income.
There, the Court appeared to deviate from a strict definition of discrete and insular when it stated:
150. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 n.2 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505.
152. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (Keeping with the idea that individuals should not
be held responsible for conditions over which they have no control, the Court reasoned that the
children of undocumented parents should not be held responsible for that condition.).
153. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973); Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505.
154. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (failing to mention
immutability as a factor for determining suspect classification).
155. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985).
156. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
157. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-4\DPL403.txt

794

unknown

Seq: 18

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

17-DEC-21

13:11

[Vol. 70:777

This disparity in voting power based on wealth cannot be described
by reference to discrete and precisely defined segments of the community as is typical of inequities challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, and there are doubtless some instances of candidates
representing the views of voters of modest means who are able to
pay the required fee. But we would ignore reality were we not to
recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as
well as candidates, according to their economic status.158

Thus, in Bullock, the Court was willing to overlook the fact that the
lower income citizens affected by the election fee were not a discrete
group and looked to the practical impact of the government’s fee.159
Only a year after Bullock, in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, the Court appeared to apply a stricter definition of the
discrete minority factor when it held that the lower-income plaintiffs
from a disproportionately funded school district were not a discrete
group for the purposes of an equal protection analysis.160
d. Contribution to Society
In determining whether a group is a suspect class, a court may look
at whether the common characteristic of the group affects an individual’s ability to contribute to society.161 In defining race as a suspect
classification, the Court noted that an individual’s race has no bearing
on his or her ability to contribute to society and classifications made
along lines of race rarely serve any legitimate state purpose.162 Similarly, both gender and illegitimacy are quasi-suspect classifications and
subject to intermediate scrutiny because a person’s gender and legitimacy of birth do not impact a person’s ability to contribute to society.163 Contrastingly, the Court declined to extend suspect
classification status to the mentally disabled because, in part, those
with mental disabilities “have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world.”164
158. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
159. Id.
160. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 69–70 (1973) (White, J. dissenting) (Justice White’s dissent cites the Court’s decision in Bullock v. Carter and argues that the
Court “would blink reality to ignore the fact that school districts, and students in the end, are
differentially affected by the Texas school-financing scheme . . .” For Justice White, that was
enough to make the plaintiffs an identifiable class.).
161. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41.
162. Id. at 440.
163. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505
(1976).
164. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
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e. Extent of Political Powerlessness
The definition of political powerlessness has changed over time. In
Frontiero, the Court described the lack of or diminished political
power as underrepresentation in political decision-making bodies.165
In the years after Frontiero, the Court shifted and began to define
political powerlessness as a lack of favorable legislation or democratic
actions favoring a group.166 Since that shift, the Court has not found a
group to be a suspect class under the favorable democratic action definition of political powerlessness.167
The evolution of the definition of political powerlessness stemmed
from Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, where Justice
Thurgood Marshall suggested that the definition of political
powerlessness should be based on whether there have been laws
passed benefitting the group.168 That is to say, if the group can attract
the attention of legislators and there is legislation that benefits the
group in question, the group is not politically powerless.169 In
Cleburne, the Court solidified that definition of political power.170
There, the mentally ill were not a suspect class because they benefited
from the protection of various state and federal laws and could attract
the attention of lawmakers.171
f. Criticisms of the Standard for defining Suspect Classes
The standard for defining suspect classifications has been criticized
as inadequate for failing to protect vulnerable groups that may need
judicial protection.172 The criticism ranges from acceptance of the doctrine but a desire to include additional groups, to calling for a complete overhaul of the doctrine based on a view that suspect
classification precedent is too unclear and contradictory to be consistently applied.173 Some scholars have argued that defining political
power as the existence of favorable legislation is a poor test and warrants reevaluation as it will preclude almost any group from benefiting
165. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17.
166. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 334–35.
167. Id. at 336.
168. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Ross
& Li, supra note 139, at 334.
169. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 334–35.
170. Id.
171. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–46 (1985); see Ross &
Li, supra note 139, at 336.
172. Pollvogt, supra note 137, at 788–95.
173. Id.
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from strict or heightened scrutiny on equal protection issues.174 The
measure of political power based on favorable democratic action essentially ensures that no other group would be found suspect as
“[e]ven the most politically marginalized groups (such as the poor,
noncitizens, and felons) have benefited from laws favoring their interests.”175 Critics contend that favorable legislation is often not an accurate measure of a group’s actual political power and advocate for an
analysis of additional factors like a group’s lobbying activities, political responsiveness, voter turnout rates, and descriptive representation
in political office.176
5. Wealth as a Suspect Classification
There is contention as to whether the Supreme Court has expressly
stated that the indigent are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class for the
purposes of an equal protection analysis.177 Certain cases in the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s protected the indigent in various contexts and in
some cases, the Court addressed poverty in ways that suggest a heightened level of scrutiny may be appropriate.178 However, the most recent and extensive discussion of the indigent and suspect classification
came in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, where
the Court held that a group of residents of a low-income school district were not a suspect class.179 Though cited as the Court’s decision
not to hold the poor as a suspect class, the Court’s narrow holding
may not have foreclosed the possibility that policies or laws discriminating based on income level could be analyzed under a heightened
level of scrutiny.180
In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Court protected the poor in a
number of decisions and indicated the possibility of the poor as a suspect class for the purposes of equal protection decisions, though many
174. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 324.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 376–79.
177. See Rose, supra note 7, at 408 (briefly discussing sources iterating the view that the Supreme Court has determined that the poor are not a suspect class).
178. Harris v. Comm’r of Corr., 860 A.2d 715, 735 (Conn. 2004) (discussing poverty as a suspect classification when a statutory scheme caused an individual to be imprisoned past the maximum period allowed because of his indigency); see also Rose, supra note 7, at 410–11 (discussing
equal protection and the poor under a criminal law context and the interconnection of poverty
and voting rights in certain cases. The author admits that viewing the cases that address both
poverty and voting rights is problematic as the voting is a fundamental right and thus garners
strict scrutiny on its own. However, the author notes that dicta in those cases is relevant to the
question of the poor as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.).
179. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1973).
180. E.g., Rose, supra note 7, at 408; Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 397–98 (2012).
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of these cases also dealt with fundamental rights.181 Nevertheless,
there was a period in the Court where “classifications on the basis of
wealth stood on the same level as classifications on the basis of race—
traditionally disfavored and subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.”182
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court stated that,
“[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”183 This analysis mirrors the Court’s analysis in other equal
protection cases involving suspect classes.184 In the early 1970s, both a
concurrence and a dissent in separate Supreme Court cases argued
that the indigent should be viewed as a suspect class. 185 In Boddie v.
Connecticut, a concurrence from Justice William O. Douglas called for
a law that discriminated based on wealth to be scrutinized like those
based on race and alienage. 186 Also, a dissent from Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Marshall in James v. Valtierra called for the indigent to
be viewed as a suspect class, stating that classifications based on poverty require “exacting judicial scrutiny[.]”187
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Dandridge v. Williams and San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez show a transition away from
favorable treatment of the poor in equal protection challenges.188 In
Dandridge, plaintiffs challenged a state practice of placing a limit on
the public welfare dollars per month per family, regardless of family
size.189 In applying rational basis review, the Court held that the practice did not violate the equal protection clause.190
181. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143–44 (1972) (In Bullock v. Carter the Supreme Court
held that a filing fee requirement with no alternative to running for public office violated equal
protection.); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
174–77 (1941); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23–24 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Julie A. Nice, A Sweeping Refusal of Equal Protection, in THE
POVERTY LAW CANON 129 (Marie A. Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds., 2016); see Ross & Li, supra
note 139, at 325.
182. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 341.
183. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (in the context of poll taxes).
184. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967).
185. See generally, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383–86 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137, 143–45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385–386.
187. James, 402 U.S. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Rose, supra note 7, at 413.
188. See generally THE POVERTY LAW CANON Part II (Marie A. Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds.,
2016) (Both decisions are discussed in the section entitled “Part II Losses.”)
189. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473 (1970).
190. Id. at 486–87.
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The State of Maryland argued the practice was in furtherance of the
legitimate state interests of encouraging employment, maintaining a
fair balance between families receiving welfare and wage-earning families, incentivizing family planning, and allocating funding as to help
the greatest number of families.191 The Court reasoned that it was not
federal courts’ duty to determine whether a state government policy
was wise or wholly logical in the furtherance of that goal. 192 Rather,
the Court was only mandated to determine whether the practice was
rationally related to the government interest.193 The Court further
stated that “the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the
business of this Court.”194 While Dandridge did not directly address
the possibility of suspect classification of the indigent, the decision expressed the Court’s aversion to scrutinizing legislative practices related to welfare and economics.195
Rodriguez is cited as the case which closed the door on the indigent
as a suspect class,196 though that notion is challenged.197 In Rodriguez,
plaintiffs sued a Texas school district on behalf of school children from
that district.198 The claim alleged that the state’s system of school
funding through local property taxation favored the wealthy and violated students’ equal protection because of the imbalance in per-pupil
expenditures.199 The District Court found that wealth was a suspect
class and that education was a fundamental right, and, thus, subjected
the school funding program to strict scrutiny.200 The lower court found
that the defendant school district failed to show the funding program
furthered a compelling government interest.201 In a 5–4 vote, the Supreme Court overturned the decision, holding that strict scrutiny was
inappropriate.202 The Court held that the program did not negatively
impact any suspect class as the group of “poor” students allegedly dis191. Id. at 483–84.
192. Id. at 484–86.
193. Id. at 484–85.
194. Id. at 487.
195. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487.
196. See Rose, supra note 7, at 408 n.1 (The author cites Erwin Chemerinsky’s constitutional
law hornbook, “In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court expressly held
that poverty is not a suspect classification and that discrimination against the poor should only
receive rational basis review.”).
197. Id.
198. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 16–18.
201. Id. at 16.
202. Id. at 16–18.
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advantaged by the program could not be definitively classified.203 In
place of strict scrutiny, the Court applied the rational basis test and
found that the funding program was rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.204
The Court reasoned that there was “no definitive description of the
classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.”205 The Court
outlined three ways the group could be defined—(1) “poor” persons
whose incomes fall below a defined level of poverty, (2) those who are
relatively poorer than others, or (3) all who reside in relatively poorer
school districts, despite their individual wealth.206
For the first means of distinguishing the plaintiff, the Court stated
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the funding disadvantaged a
group definable as indigent or living beneath a specific poverty
level.207 The Court also noted that the alleged discrimination did not
fully deprive benefit of the service, as seen in earlier cases where state
laws were invalidated.208
The Court also declined to extend suspect classification under the
second analysis, that the plaintiffs comprise a group “relatively poorer
than others[.]”209 Under this definition, the Court found that the bulk
of data presented as evidence–that the amount in school spending was
directly dependent on the median income of a district–did not actually
support the plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination.210 Lastly, the Court
found that defining the plaintiffs as those who lived in the district,
irrespective of wealth, was insufficient because it created a “large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other
districts.”211 This categorization created a group that did not have the
standard indicia of suspectness and, thus, strict scrutiny could not be
applied based on a suspect classification.212 Based on this analysis, the
Court found that strict scrutiny was not appropriate in this case and
that the rational basis test should have been applied.213
203. Id. at 19 (Additionally, the Court found that there was no fundamental right at issue in
the suit.).
204. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 19.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 19–20.
207. Id. at 22–23.
208. Id. at 23.
209. Id. at 20.
210. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 26–27.
211. Id. at 28.
212. Id.
213. Id. (The Court also determined that strict scrutiny should not have been applied as there
was no fundamental right in question.).
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III. ANALYSIS
Strict, or at least heightened, scrutiny should be applied to the IRS’s
audit practice of EITC claimants because the indigent class meets the
standard set for suspect classification and EITC recipients are a welldefined representation of that class. While the government may have
an interest in limiting the tax deficit, the administrative motivation
behind the high levels of EITC audits, the format of the correspondence audits, and the lack of productivity of the audits themselves are
indications that the IRS practice is not adequately tailored to the goal
of limiting the tax deficit.
A. EITC Recipients Under the Suspect Classification Standard
Though the factors used by the Court to determine suspect classification have varied, the factors laid out above are the characteristics
the Court has used to create suspect or quasi-suspect classes or reject
a suspect classification.214 The Court looks to whether a group has
experienced a history of discrimination, whether they share an immutable characteristic, whether they are a discrete and insular minority,
whether the uniting characteristic impacts an individual’s ability to
contribute to society, and whether the group has diminished political
power. However, not every factor is always addressed or given equal
weight.215
This Section will analyze EITC recipients under the factors set forth
by the Court to determine suspect classification and discuss how a
finding that EITC claimants are a suspect or quasi-suspect class is consistent with the Court’s precedent and the purpose of suspect classification. This Section will also address why, while audited EITC
claimants meet the suspect classification factors set forth by the Court,
it is unlikely that the Court would hold that the indigent are a suspect
or quasi-suspect class. Such a holding at this time is unlikely because
of the Court’s conservative nature216 and its hesitancy to draw distinctions based on economic condition.217

214. See supra text accompanying notes 132–71.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 132–71.
216. ‘Supreme Inequality’ Argues That America’s Top Court Has Become Right-Wing, NPR
FRESH AIR (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/24/808843704/supreme-inequality-argues-that-america-s-top-court-has-become-right-wing.
217. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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1. History of Discrimination
Historical discrimination has consistently played a role in the
Court’s finding that a group is a suspect class.218 The indigent have
encountered systemic discrimination in many facets of life due to their
economic condition.219 The poor have been subjected to discriminatory laws, discriminatory treatment within the criminal justice system,220 societal stigmatization,221 and a lack of protection in the
courts.222 It would be difficult for the Court to state that the poor have
not suffered a history of discrimination given the well-documented
treatment of the poor as a group.223
2. Immutability
The Court has looked to whether a group shares immutable visible
characteristics in order to determine whether the group is a suspect
class.224 While immutability of the characteristic that defines a group
is a consideration when determining suspect classification, it is not a
necessity.225 An immutable characteristic also does not automatically
indicate a suspect classification.226 When the Court has discussed immutability as an indicator of suspectness, it has focused on the fact
that a trait is an incidence of birth and that an individual is not culpable in choosing to belong to a group.227 The groups that enjoy heightened scrutiny are all unified by a trait that was out of the individual’s
control—gender, national origin, race, and illegitimacy.228 Poverty is
analogous to these traits in that it is also, in some circumstances, an
incidence of birth. However, while poverty is unlike these traits in that
it can change, research indicates that poverty can be cyclical, endur218. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681–82, 685 (1973); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 520–21 (1976).
219. Note, Bail and Its Discrimination Against the Poor: A Civil Rights Action as a Vehicle of
Reform, 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 167, 167 (1974); see Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 344; Stephen
Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (1993).
220. Bail and Its Discrimination, supra note 219, at 167.
221. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 344.
222. Loffredo, supra note 219, at 1283.
223. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 343–44.
224. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
225. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1973) (did not directly
discuss immutability).
226. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985); Mass. Bd. Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976).
227. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
212–13 (1976) (not culpable for gender); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (culpable for
undocumented status).
228. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); Craig, 429 U.S. at 212–13.
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ing, and not wholly within an individual’s control.229 While poverty is
not wholly immutable, there is a high likelihood that an individual
born poor will remain poor.230
Whether a trait is visible is also a consideration in determining suspect classification.231 Race, gender, and national origin may be visible,
though not always. An individual from a suspect class does not need
to show that they visually represent the class for heightened scrutiny
to be applied to their equal protection claim.232 Thus, while the visual
expression of a trait can be a factor in suspect class analysis, it is not a
prerequisite for suspect classification.233 Nevertheless, poverty is very
visible.234
3. Discrete and Insular
In a suspect classification analysis, the Court also looks to whether
the group is discrete and insular. The most thorough analysis of this
factor came in Rodriguez.235 It is important to distinguish the Court’s
holding in Rodriguez with regard to the discrete nature of EITC
claimants as a group. The plaintiffs in Rodriguez argued that they
were a sample of the poor who were being negatively impacted by the
state’s school funding policies.236 The problem for the plaintiffs in convincing the Court of their suspect status, in part, was their inability to
show that their group was defined by the trait of poverty.237 The plaintiffs argued that the school in their community was negatively impacted, but could not show that only poor people were negatively
impacted by the state’s funding practice.238 Because of this, the Court
found that the plaintiffs were not individual members of a discrete and
insular class.239
229. Ann Huff Stevens, Transitions into & out of Poverty in the United States, CTR. FOR POVRES. UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS, https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/policy-brief/transitions-out-poverty-united-states (last accessed June 30, 2021); Caroline Ratcliffe, Child Poverty and Adult
Success, URBAN INST. (Sept. 2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/65766/
2000369-Child-Poverty-and-Adult-Success.pdf.
230. Stevens, supra note 229; Ratcliffe, supra note 229.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 147–55.
232. Graham, supra note 138, at 178–79.
233. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976).
234. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 343 (“We can generally determine that people are poor
on the basis of where they live, what they possess, and their demonstrated levels of education.”);
Kendra Bischoff & Sean F. Reardon, Residential Segregation by Income, in DIVERSITY AND DISPARITIES: AMERICA ENTERS A NEW CENTURY (John Logan, ed., 2014).
235. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1973).
236. Id. at 22.
237. Id. at 22–23.
238. Id. at 54-55.
239. Id. at 25.
ERTY
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That is not an issue for audited EITC recipients. Qualification for
the EITC is a numerical value based on income and dependent children, and thus, recipients are defined by a clear line.240 Many EITC
recipients fall below the poverty line, and most make up the lowest
wage earners in the country.241 Most importantly, all EITC recipients
were deemed by the government in need of the credit based on their
level of income, familial structure, and the state of the economy.242
While being poor is difficult to define and is measured in different
ways, the fact that the government has deemed EITC recipients in
need of tax credits insulates the group as a discrete minority.
4. Ability to Contribute to Society
Being poor or receiving the EITC does not affect an individual’s
ability to contribute to society.243 This is evident, in part, because all
EITC recipients are wage earners. In finding that gender and illegitimacy of birth are quasi-suspect classes, the Court reasoned that a person’s gender or legitimacy of birth does not impact their ability to
contribute to society.244 Contrastingly, the Court found that the characteristic of mental disability and age can affect an individual’s ability
to contribute to society.245 Similar to gender and illegitimacy, the
characteristic of being poor does not impact an individual’s ability to
participate in society.
5. Extent of Political Powerlessness
Political powerlessness is the suspect classification factor that has
changed the most over time.246 Political powerlessness was initially defined as the lack of descriptive representation in political offices.247 In
more recent decisions, the existence of favorable legislation is the indicator that a group is not politically powerless.248 The definition of
240. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20.
241. CRANDALL-HOLLICK & HUGHES, supra note 25, at 1.
242. Id.
243. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 344 n.120.
244. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505
(1976).
245. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985); Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1976).
246. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 334–35; see Richard E. Levy, Political Process and
Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence,
50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 42 (2010) (discussing the differences in the way the Court has applied the
factor of political powerlessness).
247. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 326 (discussing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17).
248. Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 313; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443–45; Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 97 n.12 (1979).
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political powerlessness as favorable legislation is criticized as an inadequate measure of political power and should be abandoned.249 The
favorable legislation definition should be abandoned because it fails to
reflect the purpose of suspect classification and equal protection.250
The favorable legislation measure does not make sense as a measure of suspect classification because it would essentially preclude any
group from enjoying heightened scrutiny and makes the notion of suspect classification superfluous.251 Under the favorable legislation definition, EITC claimants would not be deemed politically powerless, as
the existence of the EITC itself is evidence of favorable legislation for
the working poor. However, under the older standard of political
powerlessness, set forth in Frontiero, EITC claimants would likely
meet that factor because the indigent lack political power as they are
underrepresented at every level of government.252
6. Present Unlikelihood of Suspect Classification
While audited EITC claimants generally meet the factors set forth
by the Supreme Court for establishing suspect classification, it is unlikely that the Court would hold that the poor are a suspect or quasisuspect class. First, the Supreme Court has never held that economic
condition is a suspect classification.253 While the Court applied heightened scrutiny in invalidating laws regarding wealth classification and
fundamental rights in an earlier series of decisions,254 more recent
holdings from the Court have not gone favorably for plaintiffs challenging laws that distinguish individuals based on wealth,255 and the
decision in Rodriguez looms large as precedent that the poor are not a
suspect class, despite the Court’s limited holding.256 Further, the historic conservatism of the Supreme Court also suggests that, generally,
a holding that benefits the indigent in any context would be unlikely.257 While the Court is nominally apolitical, some scholars suggest that the Court has, and continues to be, dominated by
249. See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 326–29.
250. Id. at 345–48.
251. Id. at 351.
252. Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 121–22, 121 n.67 (2009).
253. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 106, at 804.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 181–87.
255. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55s (1973); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142–43 (1971).
256. See Rose, supra note 7, at 418.
257. NPR FRESH AIR, supra note 216.
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conservative ideals which has led the Court to rule against the indigent on a consistent basis.258
Although it is unlikely that the current Court would find a suspect
classification in this case, history indicates that the judicial treatment
of the poor for the purposes of equal protection fluctuates.259 It is
reasonable to believe that a future Court could move back toward the
analysis of the poor more common in the 1950s to the early 1970s and
view economic classifications as suspect, along with classifications
such as race, national origin, and gender. Considering the narrowly
split decision in Rodriguez,260 it is not implausible that the Court
could eventually move closer to protecting the poor as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class for the purposes of equal protection.
The Court addressed economic condition as a suspect classification
most fully in Rodriguez in the context of school funding when it held
that the group of plaintiffs from a low-income area were not a discrete
enough group to warrant the application of suspect classification.261
However, no Court precedent has completely foreclosed on the issue
of the poor as a suspect class.262 Critics of the Court’s narrowed suspect classification standard, specifically the favorable legislation definition of political power, cite the standard’s failure to protect
marginalized groups, like the poor.263 EITC recipients, as a group,
largely meet the factors set forth by the Court to determine suspect
classification. EITC recipients are defined by the government as lowincome, based on their qualification for the credit. This makes EITC
claimants a discrete group and, unlike the plaintiffs in Rodriguez,
good candidates to enjoy strict or heightened scrutiny on the basis of
wealth. While EITC recipients meet the precedential standard for suspect classification, the Court’s historic conservatism and hesitancy to
treat economic conditions as suspect make it unlikely that the current
Court would find the poor a suspect class in any context.
B. A Claim Challenging the IRS’s EITC Auditing Practice
According to IRS data, EITC recipients are audited with correspondence audits at higher rates than any other tax group with the exception of the highest earners.264 The receipt of a correspondence audit
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id.
See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 343.
The Rodriguez decision was split 5–4. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 2.
Id. at 56–57.
Levy, supra note 246, at 36–37 n.17.
See Ross & Li, supra note 139, at 325.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 23–26 tbl.9a.
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has a negative impact on an EITC claimant, including a reduction in
the likelihood the individual will claim the credit in the future.265 The
IRS audits EITC returns at a higher rate because they are cheaper to
audit, as low-income returns are less complex than those from businesses and wealthier individuals.266 The IRS’s auditing process also
focuses on EITC recipients because of Congress’s fixation on the erroneous claims of the credit, despite the fact that improper EITC claims
make up a very small fraction of the overall tax deficit.267 The IRS’s
focus on EITC returns based on administrative ease, and the continued focus of Congress on auditing the credit despite the disproportionately low yield of additional tax dollars, is an indication of
discriminatory motivation for the auditing practice. It is possible that
an audited EITC claimant could challenge the IRS’s practice of using
correspondence audits to audit EITC claimants at disproportionately
high rates for violation of equal protection.
This Section will discuss why an audited EITC claimant would have
standing to bring a claim, both challenging the IRS auditing practice
and describing what an analysis may look like under various levels of
scrutiny. It will also discuss why a claim of this kind is supported by
evidence that suggests the IRS’s practice of high levels of audits
against this group is driven by a discriminatory purpose. Lastly, this
Section will discuss why, despite the evidence that there is an improper purpose underlying the high rate of EITC audits, a lawsuit
would be very difficult to win. Even if the Court were to apply strict or
intermediate scrutiny, plaintiffs challenging laws based on discriminatory impact or enforcement face the significant hurdle of showing the
government practice was motivated by discriminatory intent. While
evidence points to an improper motivation behind the auditing practice, it would likely not be enough to show discriminatory motivation
to satisfy Court precedent or overcome the Court’s historic hesitancy
to become involved with economic policies.268

265. Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 1; see Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 65; CRANDALLHOLLICK, supra note 36, at 4, 6; NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 34; Paul Kiel, It’s
Getting Worse: The IRS Now Audits Poor Americans at About the Same Rate as the Top 1%,
PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2019, 10:16 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/irs-now-audits-pooramericans-at-about-the-same-rate-as-the-top-1-percent; see Holt, supra note 32, at 192.
266. See Rettig Letter, supra note 62.
267. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 36, at 3–4.
268. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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1. Standing: A Claim Against the IRS for Its EITC Auditing
Practices
The standing doctrine requirements of a claim are injury, causation,
and redressability.269 An equal protection claim brought by an individual who properly claimed the EITC and was audited through a correspondence audit would have standing. Research shows that there
are negative implications for EITC recipients who are audited through
correspondence audits.270 In years after being audited, individuals are
less likely to claim potential EITC benefits, claimants are less likely to
file a tax return in general, and earners may be less likely to have
wage employment in the years right after a correspondence audit.271 If
an individual who claimed the credit was negatively impacted by an
audit could also show that they would qualify for the credit again and
would be subject to audit and harm in the same way, they would meet
the requirement for an injury in fact.272
The manner in which correspondence audits are conducted negatively impacts audits of EITC claimants.273 The impersonal nature of
correspondence audits and the confusing audit communications cause
claimants to ignore the audit or respond with incorrect information.274
This causes even proper claimants to lose the credit.275 The shortcomings of the correspondence audits are exacerbated by the confusing
process of applying for the credit, lack of access to information, minimal support from the IRS, and the lack of access to tax professionals.276 The injuries to the audited are also redressable. A court could
compel the IRS to implement more equitable auditing practices or
apply auditing resources to groups that are responsible for a greater
section of the tax deficit.

269. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
270. Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 6–7.
271. Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 6 (“[F]or audited wage earners who have wage employment (i.e., have a W-2 reported to the IRS by their employer) in the year of selection, there are
decreases in the likelihood of having wage employment in the years just after the EITC correspondence audit, and the decreases are larger for taxpayers with younger (ages 0-5) qualifying
children.”).
272. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
273. Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 39.
274. See Davis-Nozemack supra note 20, at 62–66; Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 8.
275. See Davis-Nozemack supra note 20, at 65; Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 11.
276. See Davis-Nozemack supra note 20, at 37–39.
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2. Application of Standards of Scrutiny to the IRS’s EITC Audit
Practices
If a court were to apply strict scrutiny to the issue of the IRS practice of auditing EITC recipients, the government would have to show
that it has a compelling interest and that its EITC auditing practice is
narrowly tailored to achieve the goal.277 Additionally, the practice
must be the least restrictive way to achieve the goal.278 If a court were
to apply intermediate scrutiny, the government would have to show
that the challenged practice furthers an important government interest and that the practice does so by means that are substantially related to that interest.279 Under a rational basis analysis, the
government must have a legitimate interest and the practice must be
rationally related to that interest.280
The government’s interest or goal in auditing is to efficiently mitigate the tax deficit by avoiding improper payouts of the EITC. A
court may find that limiting the tax deficit is a compelling, important,
and legitimate government interest, as the collection of taxes is an important part of a functioning government.281 Under that reasoning,
the government’s interest in limiting the tax deficit through the avoidance of improper payouts of the EITC is a compelling, important, and
legitimate interest to satisfy any standard of scrutiny. However, a
court could also find that limiting the tax deficit is not a compelling,
important, or legitimate interest. In Frontiero, the Court found that
administrative efficiency was not a sufficient reason to justify differing
treatment of the sexes.282 The Court found that while “efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance,” there are more important Constitutional interests.283 Here, the
government’s interest in limiting the deficit is related to a desire for
efficacious administration of the tax refund and auditing process. Similarly, a court could find that limiting the tax deficit in an efficacious
manner is not a legitimate interest.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 117–31.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 117–31.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 117–31.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 117–31.
281. How Are Federal Taxes Spent?, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tips/general/
how-are-federal-taxes-spent/L6kinGuUt (last updated 2019) (Taxes fund defense, social security,
safety net programs such as unemployment, Medicare and Medicaid, and other health programs,
the interest on national debt, and a variety of other programs, such as transportation, infrastructure, education, and scientific research.).
282. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973).
283. Id. at 690.
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If a court finds that efficiently limiting the tax deficit is a compelling, important, or legitimate government interest, the EITC auditing
practice must still be narrowly tailored to, substantially related to, or
legitimately related to that goal. The IRS’s practice of auditing EITC
claimants through correspondence audits at high rates is not even reasonably related to the goal of limiting the tax deficit because improper
EITC payouts represent only a small part of the tax deficit and the
productivity of the audits themselves in lessening the deficit is disproportionately low.284
The audits to EITC recipients allow the IRS to avoid paying out
improperly claimed credits, thus furthering the government’s goal of
limiting the tax deficit. However, according to IRS data, it is questionable whether the IRS’s focus of auditing EITC claims is a legitimately
productive way of limiting the tax deficit. First, estimates of the improper payments of the EITC make up only a small fraction of the
overall tax deficit.285 Further, research suggests that even those estimates are too high because the data is based on audits, which often
improperly deny the credit and fail to account for underpayments.286
This shows that the goal of lessening the tax deficit would be better
achieved by auditing a group that represents a greater portion of the
tax deficit.
In Frontiero, the Court drew attention to the government’s failure
to provide concrete evidence to support its contention that differing
treatment of female and male servicepeople actually saved the government money.287 The IRS has advised that the budget cuts and the
loss of high-level employees, who are more able to carry out audits on
higher income individuals and businesses, have made correspondence
audits of EITC claimants a more viable option.288 However, the audit
data from the IRS indicates that the agency may get more bang for its
buck auditing other income groups at higher rates.289 There is little
doubt that it is cheaper and easier to audit the poor because their
returns are simpler, but each individual audit of an EITC claimant
produces far less in payments per audit than an audit of an individual
or business at another income level. For example, while corporate returns comprise only 0.9% of the total returns filed in 2018, audits to
those returns accounted for 54% of the total additional recommended
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 36, at 3–4.
Id.
See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 70; see Holt, supra note 32, at 185 n.17.
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689.
Rettig Letter, supra note 62.
See supra notes 57–61.
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payments.290 In 2018, 13.8% of all returns were EITC returns but audits to those returns accounted for only 7.3% of the total recommended additional payments.291 Despite the fact that much more
money comes from the audits of corporations than EITC claimants,
the EITC audit rate is higher than the average corporate audit rate.292
The government’s interest in limiting the tax deficit as likely compelling, important, or legitimate. While auditing EITC recipients is
one means of achieving the goal of limiting the tax deficit, the auditing
practice is not the most effective or least restrictive means of doing so.
The relatively low efficiency of the EITC audits in lessening the deficit
compared to other methods indicates that the practice is not narrowly
tailored to, or substantially or reasonably related to, the goal of minimizing the tax deficit.
3. Discriminatory Purpose?: The Motivation of the IRS’s EITC
Audit Practice
The greatest hurdle in a case of this kind would be to show that the
IRS’s auditing practice was motivated by a discriminatory purpose on
the part of the government. Under the current standard, the plaintiff
would need to show that the IRS auditing practice did not only have a
discriminatory effect, but that the practice was motivated by a discriminatory intent or purpose.293 In analyzing discriminatory intent, the
Court looks to both circumstantial and direct evidence of an improper
purpose, which need not be the only motivation underlying a government practice.294 Events leading up to the challenged practice, legislative or administrative history, and significant changes in procedure are
all considered when determining if there is a discriminatory
purpose.295
Evidence suggests an improper purpose underlies the EITC auditing practice for two reasons. First, the IRS has admitted that EITC
claimants are audited at high rates with correspondence audits because they have low-income returns which are simpler and, thus,
cheaper to audit.296 Second, the Congressional focus on EITC audits is
290. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 23–26 tbl.9a.
291. Id.; Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 7 (EITC correspondence and field audits make up a
significant portion of overall audits at 35-40% of all correspondence audits and around 10% of
all field audits); Kiel, supra note 265 (In 2018, 43% of all individual audits were audits on taxpayers who claimed the EITC on their return.).
292. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 23–26 tbl.9a.
293. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
294. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
295. Id. at 267–68.
296. See Rettig Letter, supra note 62.
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unjustified based on the small role of improper EITC payments in the
tax deficit, the disproportionately small amount of money EITC audits collect, and the well-documented negative impact of correspondence audits. Though, despite these indications of improper purpose,
it is unlikely that the current evidence would meet the high standard
for finding discriminatory intent or overcome the Court’s historic hesitancy to become involved with economic and welfare policies.
Generally, it is cheaper to audit EITC claimants, as lower income
returns are simpler to review.297 According to the IRS, correspondence audits can be used for EITC examinations because those returns are simpler than higher income or business returns, which often
require field audits (also known as “office” or “face-to-face” audits)
and the work of highly trained employees.298 The simplicity of lowincome, EITC returns allows the IRS to use automation and low-level
employees to conduct the examinations.299 This means that EITC returns are more likely to be audited through correspondence audits because they are low-income returns. This practice draws discretionary
lines between groups on the basis of wealth, disadvantaging EITC
claimants for no other reason than administrative ease.
A related problem with the IRS’s practice of auditing EITC claimants because those refunds are cheaper to audit is an additional reason
why this group is cheaper to audit. EITC returns are not just cheaper
to audit because they are simpler. The major criticisms of correspondence audits are that they are confusing, largely automated, and fail to
offer those audited sufficient support to navigate the examination process.300 These shortcomings, coupled with the fact that many EITC
recipients have low financial literacy and less access to tax professionals, leads to few challenges to the audit, large numbers of unanswered
examination letters, and, thus, loss of the credit.301 In this way, the
IRS is able to save money through the use of correspondence audits
for EITC examinations because EITC claimants, as low-income filers,
are less likely to respond to, or challenge, an audit.302
The purpose of equal protection is to protect individuals against
government practices whose purpose or effect is to create discrete
groups based on arbitrary discrimination.303 A court could find the
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 38–39.
301. NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 34, at 378.
302. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 54–57.
303. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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explanation that correspondence audits are cheaper and easier to audit is unacceptable due to the arbitrary focus on those refunds, especially considering their negative effects.304 In Frontiero, applying a
heightened scrutiny, the Court held that administrative ease was not a
sufficient reason to support the disparate treatment of female and
male servicepeople.305 While the Court acknowledged that efficiency
and cost are important considerations in the administration of benefits, “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”306 Even if there was evidence of a cost-benefit that supported
focusing on EITC claimants,307 that may not be enough to support the
IRS’s practice.
An inference of an improper purpose can also be drawn from Congressional focus on auditing EITC refunds. On numerous occasions,
Congress has earmarked funds specifically for the examination of
EITC returns308 and enacted special penalties for improperly claiming
the credit.309 The focus on EITC returns persists despite information
from tax advocates that EITC overpayment is likely exaggerated310
and information from IRS data and credible experts that EITC overpayments comprise only a fraction of the overall tax deficit.311 The
intention behind the Congressional focus on improper payments of
the EITC is a mystery considering the relatively small amount of additional recommended payments recovered from EITC audits.312 A
court could infer improper purpose based on the Congressional drive
to limit improper payments of the credit, despite its relatively small
place in the tax deficit and the disproportionately low amount collected in audits.
From the IRS statement that the EITC claimants are audited because low-income returns are cheaper to audit and the inexplicable
Congressional focus on auditing EITC refunds despite their disproportionately low impact on the tax deficit, a court could reasonably
find that the IRS’s practice of auditing EITC claimants is based on an
improper purpose. If a plaintiff is able to successfully allege this improper purpose, the burden would shift to the government to show
304. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689–91 (1973).
305. Id.
306. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
307. See supra notes 256–58.
308. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 58.
309. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, supra note 11, at 6, 8.
310. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 51.
311. Improper Payments in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance, 114th
Cong. 27–28 (2015) (statement from the Hononorable Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of
the United States).
312. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 3, at 23–26 tbl.9a.
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that the same auditing practice would be in place regardless of the
motivation to focus on EITC audits for ease of administration.313
4. Unlikelihood that a Challenge to the IRS’s Auditing Practice
Would Succeed
The chances of success in any equal protection challenge are dependent on the level of scrutiny the Court applies. Although strict or intermediate scrutiny would be unlikely, even under rational basis, a
court could find that the auditing practice is not legitimately related to
limiting the tax deficit and is based on arbitrary distinctions drawn to
save money at the expense of EITC claimants. However, while evidence suggests that an improper purpose underlies the auditing practice, it would likely not be enough to show discriminatory purpose or
to overcome the Court’s historic hesitancy to become involved with
economic policies.314
Plaintiffs who seek to invalidate a facially neutral practice must
overcome the high burden of showing that the practice was put in
place for a discriminatory purpose.315 While evidence of discriminatory effect on a group is evidence of discriminatory purpose, impact is
not enough on its own.316 While the Court will consider both direct
and circumstantial evidence as proof of intent, intent is difficult to
show, and proof of discriminatory purpose will not immediately invalidate a government law or practice.317 Additionally, the Court has generally acted conservatively in decisions regarding economics and state
distribution of funds.318
For example, according to the Court in Dandridge v. Williams, “the
Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.”319 The
Court in Dandridge required only a tenuous connection between a
government practice related to welfare and public fund distribution
and some stated government interest.320 The Court stated that it is not
the place of the judiciary to measure the wisdom of government eco313. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 106, at 690.
314. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams 397 U.S. 471, 487
(1970).
315. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 106, at 691.
316. Washington, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42.
317. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 106, at 691.
318. See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge,
397 U.S. at 485–87.
319. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487.
320. Id. at 486–87.
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nomic practices, nor is it the Court’s position to invalidate laws simply
because they are imprecise or result in some inequality.321 Under such
a yielding standard, it is unlikely that a challenge to the IRS’s auditing
practice would succeed.
Based on the evidence of the negative impact of EITC audits on
claimants, an audited EITC claimant would meet the basic requirements for bringing an equal protection case. While the finding of a
suspect classification would be unlikely, following Supreme Court precedent on defining suspect classes, strict or intermediate scrutiny
would be the appropriate standard of review for an equal protection
claim by EITC claimants. However, even under a rational basis analysis, a court may find that the high rate of correspondence audits of
EITC claims is not rationally related to the goal of limiting the tax
deficit. While evidence suggests that an improper purpose underlies
the auditing practice, the evidence would likely be insufficient to show
discriminatory purpose or overcome the Court’s historic hesitancy to
become involved with economic policies.322
IV.

IMPACT

If a lawsuit challenging the IRS’s EITC audit practices was brought,
the Court could again fully analyze the indigent as a suspect class for
the first time in decades. Even though a claim of this sort may not
succeed, it could encourage the IRS to change its audit procedure and
provide more resources to aid EITC claimants in navigating the complicated tax system and auditing procedures. Additionally, a claim of
this kind could shed light on the issues within the U.S. tax system that
favor businesses and the wealthy.
Because EITC claimants are a well-defined group, the Court could
find that the indigent are a suspect class. Certain well-defined groups
that share the characteristic of being poor or low-income, like EITC
claimants, could gain the protection of heightened scrutiny for equal
protection claims. As income inequality grows and wages stagnate,323
the need for greater judicial and legislative protection for low-income
individuals and families is increasingly important. While the Court has
321. Id. at 485.
322. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
323. Katherine Schaeffer, 6 facts about economic inequality in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 7,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/6-facts-about-economic-inequality-inthe-u-s/; Drew DeSilver, For most U.S. workers, real wages have barely budged in decades, PEW
RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/.
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been hesitant to invalidate economic legislation,324 a challenge to the
IRS’s auditing practice could encourage legislators to focus their attention on regulation that would better protect the most vulnerable.
While a lawsuit of this kind is unlikely to succeed, the IRS’s EITC
auditing practice could be improved through other avenues. Improvements in the correspondence audit process could go a long way towards alleviating the negative impact of the audits on EITC
claimants.325 Tax reform advocates have called for a simplification of
the eligibility criteria for EITC.326 A challenge to the IRS’s EITC auditing practice could encourage the IRS to follow the detailed suggestions from tax advocates and make changes in the eligibility
requirements. A challenge may also encourage the agency to promote
better tax education, especially for lower income taxpayers who might
not have the resources to hire a tax professional. The IRS could also
provide taxpayers with better access to information and provide
claimants with the steps to appeal a correspondence audit, which
could mitigate the negative impact that the audits have on proper and
improper claimants alike.
The imbalanced nature of the IRS audit process of EITC claimants
is only one example of inequality in the tax system and the inconsistent application of tax laws.327 The discriminatory nature of EITC audits and other inconsistent applications of tax laws stems from the
deeper funding issue that has hindered the IRS in the most recent
decades. A challenge to the IRS’s auditing practices could serve to
alert Congress of the IRS’s need for funding to support a fairer and
more efficient tax system. Additional funding, and its proper allocation, could allow the IRS to improve or change automated correspondence audits. More funding would allow the IRS to increase field
audits to higher-wealth individuals and entities where higher amounts
of additional recommended dollars are acquired.
V. CONCLUSION
Following Supreme Court precedent on defining suspect classes,
there is a good case for either strict or intermediate scrutiny to apply
to equal protection claims by EITC claimants. Based on the evidence
324. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484–87; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985).
325. Guyton et al., supra note 77, at 1–2, 4, 36; see Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 64.
326. See Davis-Nozemack, supra note 20, at 71; NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT: MAKING THE EITC WORK FOR TAXPAYERS AND THE GOVERNMENT IMPROVING ADMINISTRATION AND PROTECTING TAXPAYER RIGHTS 4, 9 (2019), available at https://
www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ JRC20_Volume3.pdf.
327. See generally NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 34.
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indicating the negative impact of EITC audits on claimants, an audited EITC claimant would meet the basic requirements for bringing
an equal protection case. The government may have a compelling or
important government interest in limiting the tax deficit. However,
evidence suggests the high rate of correspondence audits of EITC returns is not a reasonable way to achieve the goal of mitigating the
deficit. Further, the IRS’s desire for administrative efficiency and the
unjustified Congressional focus underlying the motivation for the auditing practice is evidence of improper purpose. While a case of this
kind would be difficult to win, it would encourage courts to reevaluate
the indigent as a suspect class and draw attention to the impact of
budget cuts on IRS examinations, the detrimental effect of correspondence audits, and the inequities in the U.S. tax system.
Sydney Warda

